Abstract. The spi-calculus is a formal model for the design and analysis of cryptographic protocols: many security properties, such as authentication and strong confidentiality, can be reduced to the verification of behavioural equivalences between spi processes. In this paper we provide an algorithm for deciding hedged bisimilarity on finite processes, which is equivalent to barbed equivalence (and coarser than framed bisimilarity). This algorithm works with any term equivalence satisfying a simple set of conditions, thus encompassing many different encryption schemata.
Introduction
The spi calculus, introduced by Abadi and Gordon in [2] , is a process calculus designed for the description and formal verification of cryptographic protocols. Many security properties, such as authentication and strong confidentiality, can be reduced to the verification of may-testing equivalences between spi processes. Since may-testing equivalences are difficult to check in practice, other behavioural equivalences have been put forward for this calculus. In [1] Abadi and Gordon defined framed bisimilarity, a bisimulation-style equivalence which is a sound approximation of may-testing equivalence. Later, other context-sensitive equivalences have been proposed; in particular, Borgström and Nestmann defined hedged bisimilarity [3] , which is shown to be equivalent to barbed equivalence and strictly coarser than framed bisimilarity. We refer to [3] for a detailed comparison of these equivalences, which we summarize in Figure 1 .
Hüttel [4] proved that framed bisimilarity is decidable on finite processes. In this paper, we extend this result, proving that also hedged bisimilarity (and hence barbed equivalence) is decidable on finite processes. Moreover, we do not choose a specific congruence over terms; rather, the algorithm works with any congruence relation, as long as some mild conditions are satisfied. Therefore, our algorithm can be readily applied to different encryption/decryption schemata just by changing the congruence rules. These conditions are introduced in Section 2, where we recall also the syntax and late operational semantics of spi-calculus. In Section 3 we define the notion of hedged bisimilarity using this late semantics, and in Section 4 we show that it is decidable on finite spi-calculus processes (i.e. processes without replication); an algorithm in pseudo-code is provided. Some concluding remarks and directions for future work are in Section 5. 
The spi calculus
The spi-calculus extends the π-calculus with terms and primitives for encryption and decryption. In this section we define the variant we consider in this paper.
Syntax
Terms We first define the set of terms that can be used by processes, following [3] .
Definition 1 (Terms).
Let N be a countable set of names ranged over by a, b, c, n . . . , and V a countable set of variable symbols, ranged over by x, y, z . . . .
The set of spi-calculus terms is given by the grammar
A ::= a | x t ::
Intuitively, {t 1 } t2 denotes the term t 1 encrypted using key t 2 , and (t 1 , t 2 ) denotes the pair whose components are terms t 1 and t 2 . Correspondingly, we have the destructor D t2 (t 1 ), which decrypts t 1 using key t 2 , and the two projections π 1 (t), π 2 (t). We use false as a shorthand for ¬true. The set of (free) variables of a term t is denoted by fv(t); notice that there are no binding operators in terms. As usual, a term t is said to be ground if fv(t) = ∅, i.e. without (free) variables. It is said to be a message if it is ground and without occurrences of π 1 (.), π 2 (.) and D . (.) operators. We will denote with M the set of all messages, ranged over by M, N .
Unlike [2, 4] , our terms are typed. Types are defined by the following syntax:
where N, B are the base types of names and booleans respectively, and C(τ ) is the type of encrypted terms of type τ . Formally, the typing judgment t : τ over ground terms is defined by the following rules.
Congruence over terms Terms are taken up-to some structural congruence ≡, whose aim is to express the evaluation internal to processes, in particular the execution of encryption/decryption algorithms. Differently from [2] [3] [4] , we aim to account for different type of encryption algorithms that can be expressed by choosing the structural equivalence ≡. To this end, we provide a general definition of "coherent" congruence:
Definition 2 (Coherent Congruence). A congruence relation ≡ over terms is coherent if the following hold:
where n(t) is the set of all names occurring in t, t{s/a} is the syntactical substitution replacing all occurrences of a in t with the term s, and ds(.) is defined inductively by the clauses
The first condition says that two encrypted terms can be considered equal only if they encrypt messages with the same type. The second condition imposes the absence of special names (and keys): if a property holds for a name, then it must hold for every fresh name. The third condition says that congruence must be consistent with decryption: the decryption of a message M is thus guaranteed to be deterministic w.r.t. all messages in the same equivalence class of M .
It is easy to check that the equivalence used in [2] [3] [4] respects these conditions. Other encryption algorithms (and other abstract data types) can be considered by adapting the congruence relation, as long as it remains coherent; for example, we can analyze encryption protocols with commutative ciphers (like RSA) by adding the axiom ∀M :
Processes We can now define the processes of the spi-calculus.
Definition 3 (Processes).
The spi-calculus processes are defined as follows:
where t and φ are respectively a well-typed term and a boolean formula, x is a variable, a is a name and A can be both a name or a variable.
The syntax above are the usual ones from π-calculus, with these differences:
-input/output operations exchange terms, not only names and variables; -φ.P is the guard operator, that behaves as P if the boolean formula φ holds; -let x = t in P is the let operator that computes the value of t, assigns it to the variable x and then executes P .
Without loss of generality, we can assume that destructors (π 1 (.), π 2 (.) and D . (.)) do not occur in boolean predicates [t 1 = t 2 ], nor in the argument of output operations A t .P , since these cases can be simulated using the let. For instance, a π 1 (t) .P is equivalent to let x = π 1 (t) in a x .P , for x ∈ fv(P ).
Processes are taken up-to the usual structural congruence familiar from the π-calculus theory:
Semantics
To define the operational semantics of the spi-calculus we need to evaluate terms and boolean expressions. Evaluation is defined over well-typed terms, where each type denotes a set of values:
Definition 4 (Interpretation of types). The interpretation of types [[·]] :
Types → Set is defined recursively as follows:
Definition 5 (Evaluation). The evaluation for ground terms and boolean expressions is a partial function
] (implicitly parametric in the type τ ) defined recursively as follows:
We will write [
[t]] ↓ if the evaluation of t produces a value, [[t]] ↑ otherwise -i.e. when the evaluation of a decryption or a projection is unsuccessful.
Following [2, 4] (and differently from [3] ) we define a late input style operational semantics. We first define the reduction relation, which describes how processes unfold and execute internal computations in preparation for a reaction.
where v is the value of t (up-to congruence), if defined.
The next step is to define abstractions F and concretions C:
where the variable x is bound in P and names m 1 , . . . , m n are bound in M, Q.
As we will see in the semantic rules, an input a(x).P becomes an abstraction after performing a transition labeled a; this abstraction can be seen as a process waiting to receive a message on channel a. An output a M .Q becomes a concretion (νm) M Q, where m are fresh names that can appear in M and P . This concretion can be seen as a process waiting to send a message on the channel a. An abstraction (x)P and a concretion (νm) M Q can interact via synchronization resulting in a process where the message M is received by (x)P . In order to define this interaction, we need to extend restriction and parallel composition operators to abstractions and concretions, as follows:
where the two last definitions can be always applied, by α-conversion.
Finally, the operational semantics of the spi-calculus is represented by a labelled transition relation P α −→ D, where D ranges over processes, concretions and abstractions, and α ∈ {a, a | a ∈ N } ∪ {τ } is the label. As usual, the transition labelled with τ is also called silent transition or τ -transition. The relation is defined by the rules given in Figure 2 . As usual, we also define
Hedged bisimilarity
In this section we define the hedged bisimilarity, introduced in [3] . The basic idea is to mimic the frame-theory pairs of the framed bisimilarity defined in [1] , but dropping the separate frame component and including corresponding names as part of the theory. The resulting theory is then called a hedge. 
Late operational semantics of the spi-calculus.
The first condition requires a consistent hedge to match names with names. The second one requires that π 1 (h) and π 2 (h) are in bijection. The last one requires that all encrypted messages cannot be decrypted using keys in h: encrypted messages in a consistent hedge are not reducible. Alongside (consistent) hedges, we define synthesis, analysis, irreducibles. The synthesis of a hedge h is the set of message pairs that can be built from h.
Definition 7 (Synthesis). The synthesis S(h) of a hedge h is defined as the least subset of M
2 that satisfies:
We write h ⊢ M ↔ N for (M, N ) ∈ S(h), and in this case we say that M and N are homologous w.r.t. h.
The analysis of a hedge is the set of all message pairs obtained by "opening" the messages of h via decryption or projection. The irreducibles are those elements in the analysis of a hedge that cannot be reduced further. Formally:
Definition 8 (Analysis). The analysis A(h) of a hedge h is defined as the least set that satisfies:
Moreover, we define the irreducibles I(h) of a hedge h as
It should be noted that all elements that can be reduced in the analysis can be derived from the irreducibles via synthesis, i.e. S(I(h)) = S(A(h)). Lastly, since every hedge is a finite set, its analysis and irreducibles are also finite.
Hedge simulations Let us recall that H and P are the set of all hedges and the set of all processes, respectively. A hedged relation R is a subset of H × P × P.
We write h ⊢ P RQ when (h, P, Q) ∈ R. Moreover, we say that R is consistent if, for all h ∈ H, h ⊢ P RQ implies that the hedge h is consistent.
Definition 9 (Hedged simulation). A consistent hedged relation R is a hedged simulation if, whenever h ⊢ P RQ we have that:
The first condition requires that for each τ -transition from P there is a path of τ -transition from Q such that the two target processes are in the simulation R.
The second condition requires that for each output transition of P , labelled with a, there is an output transition from Q labelled with b (and possibly preceded by some silent transitions); moreover, a and b are homologous in h and the processes after the two output operations are paired in R w.r.t. a consistent hedge that extends h by pairing the two messages M and N . The last condition requires that for each input transition of P with label a, there is an input transition from Q labelled with b (and possibly preceded by some silent transitions); moreover, a and b are homologous in h and for all finite set B of fresh names w.r.t. P , Q and h, the abstractions (x)P ′ and (x)Q ′ are paired in the simulation R for each input messages (M, N ) homologous by h ∪ id B .
Definition 10 (Hedged bisimulation and bisimilarity). A hedged simulation R is a hedged bisimulation if
R −1 = {(h −1 , Q, P ) | h ⊢ P RQ} is also a hedged simulation (where h −1 = {(N, M )|(M, N ) ∈ h}).
Hedged bisimilarity, written ∼, is the greatest hedged bisimulation, i.e. the union of all hedged bisimulations.
Remarkably, hedged bisimilarity coincides with barbed bisimilarity [3] .
Decidability of hedged bisimulation for finite processes
Definition 9 does not provide us with a means for checking bisimilarity. In this Section we address this issue, following, when possible, the approach in [4] .
Clearly, bisimilarity is undecidable for general, infinite processes; hence, we focus on finite processes, i.e. without replication. Even on finite processes decidability of hedged bisimilarity is not obvious, since the third condition in Definition 9 requires to check the equivalence of two abstractions for an infinite number of messages w.r.t. any finite set of fresh names. In this section we prove that there is a finite bound on the number of these names and messages. If this bound exists, then the hedged bisimilarity is trivially decidable.
The idea behind our result, as in [4] , is the following: if (x)P is finite, then it can inspect a message (using let and guard operators) up to a certain depth k. If a message M with more than k nested constructors is received by (x)P , then it can only be partially analysed by P . Hence, all messages M ′ equivalent to M up to depth k will not cause any difference in the execution of (x)P , apart from output messages. Indeed, P {M/x} and P {M ′ /x} can output different messages (i.e. different parts of M and M ′ respectively), but we notice that:
-the two outputs are derived from M and M ′ by applying the same operations; -only messages obtained through decryption are interesting, since they can update the hedge h yielding a richer theory.
We now proceed to formalize this idea.
Definition 11 (Maximal constructor depth). The maximal constructor depth mcd(M ) of a message M is defined inductively by the clauses
and then extended to boolean formulas as follows:
Definition 12 (k-homologous). Given h ∈ H and M, N ∈ M, we define
Whenever h ⊢ k M ↔ N we say that M and N are k-homologous in h.
The notion of maximal constructor depth is readily extended to hedges: 
If there is a finite set of names B ⊂ N such that
-B ∩ n(h) = ∅; -h ∪ id B is consistent; -h ∪ id B ⊢ k M ↔ N-if P τ −→ P ′ then there exists Q ′ such that Q =⇒ Q ′ and h ⊢ P ′ RQ ′ ; -if P a −→ (νm) M P ′ and {m}∩(fn(P )∪n(π 1 (h))) = ∅ then there exist b ∈ N and a concretion (νn) M Q ′ such that h ⊢ a ↔ b, {n}∩(fn(Q)∪n(π 2 (h))) = ∅, Q b =⇒ (νn) M Q ′ and I(h ∪ {(M, N )}) ⊢ P ′ RQ ′ ; -if P a −→ (x)P ′ then there exist b ∈ N and an abstraction (y)Q ′ such that h ⊢ a ↔ b, Q b =⇒ (y)Q ′ and for all B ⊂ N , where |B| ≤ 2 d , B ∩ (fn(P ) ∪ fn(Q) ∪ n(h)) = ∅ and h ∪ id B is consistent, for all pairs (M, N ) of ground terms, if ∃k ≤ d h ∪ id B ⊢ k M ↔ N then h ∪ id B ⊢ P ′ {M/x}RQ ′ {N/y}.
Definition 14 (d-hedged bisimulation and bisimilarity).
A d-hedged bisim- ulation is a d-hedged simulation R such that R −1 = {(h −1 , Q, P ) | h ⊢ P RQ}, where h −1 = {(N, M )|(M, N ) ∈ h}, is also a d-hedged simulation. The d-hedged bisimilarity, written ∼ d ,
is the greatest d-hedged bisimulation, i.e. the union of all d-hedged bisimulations.
These definitions immediately lead to the following results. 
Proposition 1. (a) Every hedged bisimulation is also a d-hedged bisimulation
We now aim to show that, for any two processes P, Q, there exists d ≥ 0 such that ∃h ∈ H h ⊢ P ∼ d Q ⇒ ∃h ∈ H h ⊢ P ∼ Q. This does not hold for arbitrary infinite processes since these can analyse messages of arbitrary depth. Therefore, we now consider only the fragment of spi-calculus without replication.
It should be noted that let and guard operators are the only constructs that can check the structure of messages. For instance, the process c(x).[x = t].P uses the term t to "test" a message received along channel c; therefore, any message with depth greater than t's will fail the test, and hence we can consider to send the process only messages with depth up-to that of t. This observation leads to the following definition of analysis depth.
Definition 15 (Analysis depth). Let P be a finite process. The analysis depth of P , denoted by ad(P ), is defined inductively by the clauses
where, in the case of the let operator, t ′ is any message such that mcd(t ′ ) = mcd(t) (e.g., t ′ can be obtained by nesting mcd(t) encryptions with a fresh name) and the maximal destructor depth of a term is defined as follows:
Definition 16 (Critical depth). Let P and Q be two finite processes and let h be a hedge. The critical depth CD(h, P, Q) is defined by CD(h, P, Q) mcd(h) + max(ad(P ), ad(Q)) + 1 Remark 1. In the definition of analysis depth (Definition 15) we have taken into account also the analysis done by matching operators. This differs from Hüttel's work about framed bisimilarity, where in the definition of the analysis depth (there called "maximal destruction depth" [4, Def. 13]) it is ad([M = N ].P ) = ad(P ). In fact, it is crucial to consider also the matching operator. As an example, let us consider the following processes and frame-theory pair:
According to [4] the critical depth would be CD((f r, th), P, Q) = 0; hence {a} a would not be considered as a possible input message, since mcd({a} a ) = 1 and (f r, th) ⊢ 0 {a} a ↔ {a} a . Therefore P and Q would behave similarly for each input message tested by Hüttel's algorithm, leading to incorrectly conclude that (f r, th) ⊢ P ∼ Q. This does not happen if the analysis depth takes into account the number of constructors used by matching operators, as in Definition 15. ⊓ ⊔ As we will formally see below, when checking if a d-hedged simulation exists, we can correlate two input P a −→ (x)P ′ and Q b −→ (x)Q ′ w.r.t. a hedge h, simply by testing the equivalence between P ′ and Q ′ w.r.t. messages with maximal constructor depth less or equal to CD(h, P, Q). Moreover, Lemma 1 limits the number of fresh names we must consider to 2 CD(h,P,Q) .
We will now prove that, if P, Q are finite processes and d = CD(h, P, Q) then
This result is based on the definition of d-pruning and two lemmata that show the equivalence of the transition system when considering only messages M such that mcd(M ) ≤ CD(h, P, Q). 
where Critical depth and d-pruning are readily extended to processes and messages: We proceed by induction on the structure of φ. The inductive cases are easy:
Let us consider the base case of matching predicate [t 1 = t 2 ]. If fv(t 1 ) ∪ fv(t 2 ) = ∅ then the result of the matching is independent from the message and the lemma trivially holds. Otherwise, i.e. fv(t 1 ) ∪ fv(t 2 ) = {x}, the matching Therefore, for each path in the syntactic tree of t 1 ending with an occurence of x, there is an equivalent path in t 2 ending with either an occurrence of x or a message of the same type of M ; and vice versa for the occurrences of x in t 2 . Hence, without loss of generality we can limit ourselves to matchings of the form Proof. By induction on the transition rules. Let us start with the parallel rule. Let P = Q|U . By inductive hypothesis
and therefore, the application of the parallel rule leads to
The same reasoning can be used for sum and restriction rules. For equivalence rules, only reduction rules modifies the processes substantially. Therefore, we can use Lemma 2 and the proof steps are equivalent to the ones of the parallel rule.
Let us consider now the input rule, i.e., P {M/x} = (t(y).Q){M/x}. Since (t(y).Q){M/x} must be a ground process, fv(t(y).Q) ⊆ {x} and t can only be a name or equal to x. If x = t ∈ N , then the transition is independent from M and will also occur for N . Otherwise, t = x and the transition will occur only if M is a name. Moreover, if M ∈ N then M = pr d (M ) = N and therefore the transition will also occur for (t(y).Q){N/x}. It also holds that P ′ M = P ′ N . The case for output rules is similar to input 's, since the transition of a term (t X .Q){M/x} only depends on the channel t.
Let us now prove the lemma for interaction rules. By inductive hypothesis:
1 HB(h, P, Q) = 
Conclusions and further work
In this paper we have proved that hedged bisimilarity is decidable on finite processes of the spi calculus. Our algorithm, which generalizes the ideas in [4] , can be readily applied to different encryption/decryption schemata just by changing the congruence rules, as long as some mild conditions are satisfied. Actually, a possible future work is to investigate the algebraic laws needed to represent in the structural congruence the properties of various encryption algorithms: often these laws are omitted from formalizations, leading to security flaws in protocols.
Another direction is to consider other fragments of the spi-calculus beyond finite processes; depth-and restriction-bounded processes are particularly promising.
